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A New Transparency: How to Ensure
Disclosure from “Mixed-Purpose”
Groups After Citizens United
By TARA MALLOY*
Introduction
POLITICAL TRANSPARENCY HAS LONG BEEN HERALDED as
the “best of disinfectants” for government.1 Indeed, as recently as its
2010 decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, the Su-
preme Court recognized that campaign finance disclosure is a vital
measure to “enable[ ] the electorate to make informed decisions and
give proper weight to different speakers and messages.”2 Yet the 2010
federal elections following this decision were marked by an unprece-
dented dearth of disclosure in connection with the independent cam-
paign-related spending of a newly-energized sector: namely, tax-
exempt, non-profit corporations organized under section 501(c) of
the Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”).
Citizens United freed corporations and unions to make expendi-
tures to influence federal and state candidate elections for the first
time in over six decades.3 It did not, however, invalidate any disclo-
sure laws; to the contrary, eight Justices upheld the federal disclosure
law that was also challenged in the case.4 Nevertheless, Citizens United
led to a period of deficient disclosure by authorizing new campaign-
* Associate Legal Counsel, The Campaign Legal Center. B.A., Emory University,
1998; J.D., Yale Law School, 2002. The views expressed in this Article are those of the
author, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Legal Center.
1. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976) (quoting LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, What Publicity
Can Do, in OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY: AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 62 (Nat’l Home Library
Found. 1933) (1914)).
2. 130 S. Ct. 876, 916 (2010).
3. The prohibition on corporate and union expenditures in elections was first en-
acted in 1947 as a part of the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, ch.
120, § 304, 61 Stat. 136, 159 (superseded by Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments
of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, sec. 112, § 321(a), 90 Stat. 475, 490 (codified as amended at 2
U.S.C. § 441b(a) (2006))).
4. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 914–16.
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related expenditures that existing federal disclosure requirements
were ill-equipped to handle. Under existing federal campaign finance
law, a corporation that makes direct expenditures on campaign-related
advertisements is required to disclose its involvement to the public.5
If, on the other hand, the corporation contributes to certain 501(c)
tax-exempt groups and those groups use such contributions for cam-
paign-related advertisements, in most cases the group is not required
to disclose the corporation’s contributions under either federal cam-
paign finance law or federal tax law.6 Only the name of the 501(c)
front group is reported.
Unsurprisingly, given this regulatory landscape, corporations and
other wealthy interests increasingly turned to 501(c) groups as vehi-
cles to conceal their campaign-related independent spending in the
2010 federal elections. Ultimately, tax-exempt groups that did not dis-
close their donors financed almost half of the $300 million in inde-
pendent spending in 2010.7
Why did federal campaign finance law fail so spectacularly to cap-
ture this spending, or more specifically, to require donor disclosure in
connection with this spending? Most immediately, the federal disclo-
sure requirements applicable to independent campaign-related
spending were fatally weakened by the Federal Election Commission
(“FEC”) in 2007, prior to the Citizens United decision. But more funda-
mentally, these 501(c) conduits for corporate money were able to
evade disclosure because they engaged in—or claimed to engage in—
both campaign-related advocacy and issue advocacy. These groups were
“mixed-purpose” in nature; they allegedly did not have campaign-re-
lated activity as their major purpose.
Mixed-purpose groups have long confounded efforts to ensure
effective disclosure in connection with independent spending to influ-
ence candidate elections. First, it is difficult to tailor laws to target the
donors to a mixed-purpose group who intended to fund, or in fact
funded, the group’s campaign-related advocacy, instead of its issue ad-
vocacy or other activities. Second, laws that are not carefully tailored
in this respect may be vulnerable to constitutional challenge under
the First Amendment.
5. See infra Part II.A.
6. See infra Parts I.B, II.B.
7. See Outside Spending, OPENSECRETS.ORG (CENTER RESPONSIVE POL.), http://www.
opensecrets.org/outsidespending/index.php (last visited Oct. 8, 2011) [hereinafter Total
Outside Spending] (looking at the chart entitled “Total Outside Spending by Election Cycle,
Excluding Party Committees”).
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This Article will analyze the legal and constitutional challenges to
obtaining meaningful disclosure of donors funding the campaign-re-
lated spending of mixed-purpose groups. The first Part of this Article
will discuss the effect of Citizens United on the 2010 elections and the
specific disclosure deficit that arose from the decisions of corpora-
tions and other special interests to route their campaign money
through mixed-purpose 501(c) groups. Second, this Article will review
the disclosure requirements for independent campaign-related spend-
ing in federal campaign finance law and describe the FEC’s actions
that undermined these requirements. Third, this Article will analyze
the broader constitutional considerations that arise when donor dis-
closure is required of mixed-purpose groups and discuss the large-
scale legal effort by opponents of campaign finance reform to invali-
date or limit disclosure in this area. The final Part will present several
models for obtaining donor disclosure in connection with mixed-pur-
pose groups and will assess the constitutionality and effectiveness of
such proposals. This Article concludes that the enhanced disclosure
required by these models—some of which have already been imple-
mented at the state level—is necessary to maintain transparency in
candidate elections, and furthermore, is constitutional under the Su-
preme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence.
I. The Effect of Citizens United on the 2010 Elections
A. Change in the Law and Supreme Court Jurisprudence
In Citizens United, the Supreme Court overruled its decision in
Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce8 and part of its decision in
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission,9 which collectively had estab-
lished the constitutional rationale for the restriction of independent
spending by corporations to influence candidate elections. Prior to
this decision, corporations and unions were prohibited from using
treasury funds to finance two types of independent spending: inde-
pendent “expenditures” (“IEs”) and “electioneering communications”
(“ECs”).10 But in Citizens United, the Court struck down these federal
restrictions on corporate expenditures in federal elections,11 which
8. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
9. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
10. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a)(1), (b)(2) (prohibiting corporate and union expenditures
and electioneering communications); FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449
(2007) (narrowing funding restriction applicable to corporate and union electioneering
communications); see also Part II.A.
11. 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006), invalidated by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913.
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had the effect of invalidating the parallel restrictions on union spend-
ing as well. The decision also threw into legal jeopardy the statutes in
twenty-four states that had restricted corporate campaign-related
spending in state elections.12 As a result, in the 2010 elections, corpo-
rations and unions for the first time in decades could spend their trea-
sury funds independently to influence candidate elections.
Prior to Citizens United, corporations and unions were required to
establish a political action committee (“PAC”) to make either political
contributions or expenditures, as defined by the law, to influence a
federal election.13 This choice was often referred to as the “PAC op-
tion.” However, corporate PACs were barred from using corporate
treasury funds to finance their campaign contributions or expendi-
tures.14 Instead, they were required to fund their campaign activities
exclusively with contributions raised under the federal contribution
limits15 and solicited only from the corporation’s “restricted class” of
officers, employees, and shareholders.16 Further, as a federal political
committee, a corporate PAC was subject to comprehensive political
committee disclosure requirements, including that it report all of its
contributions and disbursements in regular filings with the FEC.17
This will be discussed in detail in Part II.A. infra.
Following Citizens United, corporations and unions were released
from all restrictions on their independent campaign-related spend-
12. ALA. CODE §§ 10A-21-1.02, 10A-21-1.03 (LexisNexis through 2011 Reg. Sess.);
ALASKA STAT. §§ 15.13.135, 15.13.400 (LEXIS through 2010 Reg. Sess.); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 16-921 (2011); COLO. CONST. art. XXVIII, § 3(4)(a); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN § 9-
613(a) (Supp. 2009); IOWA CODE ANN. § 68A.503 (West 2011); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 121.035 (West 2011); MASS. ANN. LAWS, Ch. 55, § 8 (LexisNexis 2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. §§ 169.251, 169.254 (West 2011); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 211B.15 (West 2011) (invali-
dated by Minn. Chamber of Commerce v. Gaertner, 710 F. Supp. 2d 868 (D. Minn. 2010));
MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-35-227(1) (2011) (invalidated by Canyon Ferry Road Baptist Church
of East Helena, Inc. v. Unsworth, 556 F.3d 1021, 1023 (9th Cir. 2009)); N.Y. ELEC. LAW
§ 14-116 (McKinney 2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 163-278.19 (West 2011); N.D. CENT.
CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-08.1-03.3, 16.1-08.1-03.5 (West 2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3599.03
(West 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74 ch. 62 app. 257:10-1-2 (2011); 25 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 3253 (West 2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 17-25-10.1(h)(1) (West 2011); S.D. CODI-
FIED LAWS § 12-27-18 (2011); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-19-132 (West 2011), repealed by 2010
Pub. Acts, c. 1095, § 1, eff. June 23, 2010; TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. §§ 253.094, 253.104 (West
2010); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-8-8 (West 2011); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 11.38(1)(a)1 (West 2011);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 22-25-102 (West 2011).
13. See 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(A)(i) (defining “contribution”); id. § 431(9)(A)(i) (defining
“expenditure”); see also id. § 441b(b)(2)(C) (authorizing formation of separate segregated
fund).
14. Id. § 441b(b)(2).
15. Id. § 441a(a)(1); 11 C.F.R. § 114.5(f) (2011).
16. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(4); 11 C.F.R. §§ 114.5–114.8.
17. 2 U.S.C. §§ 432, 433, 434(a)(4), 441d (2006).
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ing.18 The practical impact of this decision was a vast change in the
magnitude of the political money available. The differential was par-
ticularly acute in the case of corporations. Compare a corporate PAC
spending hundreds of thousands of dollars of voluntary contributions
from its restricted class to a corporation tapping a treasury that could
total millions or even billions of dollars in potential funds. Predict-
ably, independent campaign-related spending in the 2010 federal
elections surged, topping out at approximately $304.7 million—a
fourfold increase from the total independent spending in the last fed-
eral midterm election in 2006.19
Because Citizens United eliminated the requirement that corpora-
tions and unions establish a PAC in order to spend in federal elec-
tions, it also effectively eliminated the comprehensive PAC reporting
requirements that had formerly applied to corporate or union cam-
paign-related spending. Consequently, the decision also allowed these
actors to evade disclosure of their campaign activity. It is important to
reiterate, however, that the Citizens United decision did not itself invali-
date any campaign finance disclosure law, but rather strongly en-
dorsed the federal disclosure law that was also challenged in the
case.20 Nevertheless, Citizens United, by both releasing a vast new reser-
voir of political money and eliminating the PAC requirement for cor-
porate campaign-related expenditures, put increased pressure on
federal campaign finance law governing the disclosure of campaign-
related spending.
B. The Search for Anonymous Vehicles for Spending
The freedom created by Citizens United for corporate and union
political activity also came with certain risks. In particular, corpora-
tions are often reluctant to be publicly associated with express cam-
paign advertisements, because overt political advocacy can alienate
their shareholders and customers and complicate their branding and
marketing strategies.21 Consequently, following Citizens United, corpo-
18. Because Citizens United considered only the federal restriction on corporate ex-
penditures, the decision did not change the federal law requiring corporations to create
PACs in order to give direct contributions to candidates and parties. See id. § 441b(a),
(b)(2).
19. See Total Outside Spending, supra note 7. R
20. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 916 (2010).
21. The cautionary tale for corporate spending in 2010 was Target Corporation. In
2010, Target contributed $150,000 to MN Forward, a Minnesota PAC that was required to
disclose its donors under state law. When that PAC made an expenditure to support the
campaign of the antigay marriage Republican candidate for governor, Tom Emmer, Tar-
\\jciprod01\productn\S\SAN\46-2\SAN205.txt unknown Seq: 6 14-FEB-12 17:34
430 UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46
rations wishing to become politically active had an incentive to find
spending vehicles that could shield their campaign-related spending
from the public. In the 2010 elections, it appeared that the vehicles of
choice for corporations and other wealthy interests were tax-exempt,
not-for-profit corporations organized under section 501 of the IRC
that were not required to publicly disclose their donors under federal
tax law.22
The IRC provides tax-exempt status to many types of organiza-
tions for a range of exempt purposes.23 A number of these tax-exempt
organizations are permitted to engage in “participation or interven-
tion in political campaigns on behalf of or in opposition to any candi-
date for public office”24 (i.e., “campaign intervention”) without
publicly disclosing their donors under the federal tax laws.25 These
include “social welfare organizations” organized under section
501(c)(4) of the IRC, labor organizations organized under section
501(c)(5), and trade associations organized under section
501(c)(6).26
get came under fire for engaging in political activities that appeared to contradict its own
gay-friendly employment policies and public image. See Jia Lynn Yang & Dan Eggen, Exercis-
ing New Ability to Spend on Campaigns, Target Finds Itself a Bull’s-eye, WASH. POST (Aug. 19,
2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/08/18/AR201008
1806759.html?wprss=rss_nation. This disclosure led to protests and boycotts of Target led
by gay rights groups and other activists. See Jennifer Martinez & Tom Hamburger, Target
Feels Backlash from Shareholders, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/
2010/aug/19/nation/la-na-target-shareholders-20100820; Brian Montopoli, Target Boycott
Movement Grows Following Donation to Support “Antigay” Candidate, CBS NEWS (July 28, 2010),
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20011983-503544.html.
22. Prior to Citizens United, non-profit corporations were also barred from using trea-
sury funds to make campaign-related contributions or expenditures unless they qualified
for an exemption under the Supreme Court decision in FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc.
(MCFL), 479 U.S. 238 (1986). The “MCFL exemption” allowed non-profit advocacy corpo-
rations to make expenditures to influence candidate elections if they did not accept contri-
butions from business corporations or unions. See id. at 264. Thus, prior to the Citizens
United decision, non-profit corporations were barred from making IEs if they served as a
conduit for business corporate funds. After the decision, non-profit corporations could—
and likely did—become vehicles for the campaign-related spending of business corpora-
tions and unions.
23. I.R.C. § 501(c) (2006).
24. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii) (1990).
25. Tax-exempt organizations generally are required to file an IRS Form 990, an an-
nual information return with the IRS. See I.R.C. § 6033 (2006). Section 501(c)(4), (c)(5),
and (c)(6) organizations must report the aggregate costs of their lobbying and campaign
activities in their Form 990, which is public information. See IRS Form 990, Sched. A, Pub-
lic Charity Status and Public Support (OMB No. 1545-0047). These organizations must also
report the names and addresses of significant donors, but this information is not publicly
disclosed. See IRS Form 990, Sched. B, Schedule of Contributors (OMB No. 1545-0047).
26. I.R.C. § 501(c)(4)–(6); see id. § 501(h)(3).
\\jciprod01\productn\S\SAN\46-2\SAN205.txt unknown Seq: 7 14-FEB-12 17:34
Fall 2011] A NEW TRANSPARENCY 431
Importantly, however, a 501(c)(4), (c)(5), or (c)(6) organization
is not permitted under its tax status to have campaign intervention as
its “primary activity.”27 Thus, a 501(c)(4) group that focuses primarily
or exclusively on campaign intervention is vulnerable to revocation of
its tax-exempt status. However, for the true mixed-purpose group that
engages in both issue advocacy and campaign intervention, 501(c)(4)
status may be the appropriate vehicle for its operations and would al-
low such groups to engage in a broad range of political activities while
shielding its donors from public disclosure under the tax laws.
A group seeking tax-exempt status that engages primarily in cam-
paign intervention, on the other hand, is required to organize under
a different section of the federal tax code, section 527, which carries
with it significant disclosure requirements.28 The IRC defines a sec-
tion 527 group as a “political organization . . . organized and operated
primarily for the purpose of directly or indirectly accepting contribu-
tions or making expenditures, or both, for an exempt function.”29
The IRC further provides that an “exempt function” in this context is
“influencing or attempting to influence the selection, nomination,
election, or appointment of any individual to any Federal, State, or
local public office . . . .”30
Virtually all state and federal political committees are organized
under section 527 because their primary purpose is campaign-related.
On the other hand, not all section 527 groups are required to register
as political committees, because some will not meet the definition of
political committee under the applicable federal or state campaign
finance law.
Although groups organized under section 527 are permitted to
make unlimited expenditures for campaign intervention, they are re-
quired to provide full disclosure of their activities under either the tax
law or federal or state campaign finance laws.31 Since 2000,32 the fed-
eral tax law required 527 groups that do not report as political com-
27. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(i) (1960); Rev. Rul. 81–95, 1981–1 C.B. 332
(“Although the promotion of social welfare within the meaning of section 501(c)(4)-1 of
the regulations does not include political campaign activities, the regulations do not im-
pose a complete ban on such activities for section 501(c)(4) organizations. Thus, an organ-
ization may carry on lawful political activities and remain exempt under section 501(c)(4)
as long as it is engaged primarily in activities that promote social welfare.”).
28. See I.R.C. § 527 (2006).
29. Id. § 527(e)(1).
30. Id. § 527(e)(2).
31. See id. § 527(j); see also 2 U.S.C. §§ 432, 433, 434(a)–(b).
32. See Act of July 1, 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-230, 114 Stat. 477 (2000) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
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mittees under federal or state campaign finance law to file regular
disclosure reports with the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”).33 These
reports must include every contributor who gave over $200 to the 527
during the year, along with the amount and date of the contribu-
tion.34 Alternatively, a 527 group that is registered as a federal political
committee must comply with comprehensive disclosure requirements
under the federal campaign finance law, which will be outlined in fur-
ther detail Part II.A. infra.
Faced with this regulatory structure, corporations, unions, and
other wealthy interests wishing to route their campaign spending
through independent groups in the 2010 federal elections had to
make a trade-off between the anonymity of a 501(c) group and the
political focus of a 527 group. In the 2010 elections, the available pub-
lic reporting indicated that these interests utilized both types of tax-
exempt vehicles.35
According to the Center for Responsive Politics, approximately
half of the independent spending to influence the 2010 federal elec-
tions was attributable to 527 organizations or other groups that pro-
vided full donor disclosure to either the FEC or IRS.36
The key development in the 2010 election, however, was the shift
in independent political spending from relatively transparent vehicles
to the mixed-purpose 501(c) groups which do not provide donor dis-
closure. In the 2006 midterm election 501(c) groups conducted virtu-
ally no independent spending, whereas in 2010, 501(c) groups
accounted for approximately 42% of independent spending.37 In-
deed, in 2010, the largest two spenders were the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, a 501(c)(6) group, and American Action Network, a
33. See I.R.C. § 527(j)(2), (j)(5); see also IRS Form 8872, Political Organization Report
of Contributions and Expenditures (OMB No. 1545-1696) [hereinafter IRS Form 8872],
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f8872.pdf.
34. See I.R.C. § 527(j)(3); IRS Form 8872, supra note 33. The failure to make such R
disclosure is subject to a penalty equal to the highest corporate tax rate multiplied by the
amount of contributions and/or expenditures to which the failure relates. I.R.C.
§ 527(j)(1).
35. See 2010 Outside Spending, by Groups, OPENSECRETS.ORG (CENTER RESPONSIVE POL.),
http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2010&disp=O&type=A&
chrt=D (last visited Nov. 12, 2011) [hereinafter 2010 Outside Spending]; see also Spencer
MacColl, Citizens United Decision Profoundly Affects Political Landscape, OPENSECRETSBLOG
(May 5, 2011, 11:16 AM), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2011/05/citizens-united-de-
cision-profoundly-affects-political-landscape.html.
36. See 2010 Outside Spending, supra note 35 (filter by “Non-Party Committees”); see also R
MacColl, supra note 35. R
37. MacColl, supra note 35. R
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501(c)(4) group, spending $32.9 and $26.1 million respectively.38 In
short, in the 2010 elections, donors in significant numbers chose the
anonymity provided by a mixed-purpose group over the political focus
provided by a 527 group.
Disclosure declined precipitously as a result. In 2006, only about
1%  of independent spending in the election was undisclosed; by con-
trast, in 2010, approximately 47% of all independent electoral spend-
ing was made through groups that did not disclose their donors.39
Given the lack of disclosure, it is difficult to quantify the degree
to which this shift to 501(c) groups in 2010 was specifically fueled by
Citizens United and the corporate and union expenditures that the de-
cision authorized. However, the prominence of groups affiliated with
corporate interests, such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, strongly
suggests a significant corporate role.
In this manner, Citizens United played a part in fueling the turn to
501(c) groups for independent spending in 2010. But the reason that
these 501(c) groups had so few disclosure obligations was the FEC’s
decision to undermine the existing federal campaign finance laws that
would have required donor disclosure in connection with at least
some portion of this spending by 501(c) groups. Thus, the indepen-
dent spending unleashed by Citizens United—and the fact that many
deep-pocketed donors apparently preferred to make expenditures
through anonymous 501 groups—exacerbated pre-existing weak-
nesses in federal campaign finance law. But Citizens United did not cre-
ate the problem of disclosure in connection with mixed-purpose
groups.
II. The Legal Dimensions of Disclosure
Mixed-purpose groups engaging in campaign-related advocacy
have long raised challenges with respect to disclosure. As discussed
above, federal tax law does not require a number of tax-exempt corpo-
rations organized under section 501 to publicly disclose their donors.
Federal campaign finance law has not proven to be much more effec-
tive. This was particularly the case in 2010, when independent spend-
ing disclosure requirements were either inapplicable to mixed-
38. See 2010 Outside Spending, supra note 35. R
39. MacColl, supra note 35. Compare 2010 Outside Spending, supra note 35, with 2006 R
Outside Spending, OPENSECRETS.ORG (CENTER RESPONSIVE POL.), http://www.opensecrets.
org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2006&chrt=D&disp=O&type=P (last visited Nov.
12, 2011).
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purpose groups, or if applicable, had been so weakened by the FEC as
to be ineffective.
A. The Federal Campaign Finance Disclosure Regime
The Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”)40 creates a two-tier
structure for the disclosure of independent spending41 to influence
federal candidate elections. First, “political committees” whose major
purpose relates to campaign-related advocacy are required to comply
with comprehensive disclosure requirements.42 Second, individuals
and mixed-purpose groups are required to file more limited, ad-spe-
cific reports in connection with certain types of independent cam-
paign-related advertisements.43
With respect to the first tier of disclosure requirements, federal
political committees are subject to detailed organizational, reporting,
and disclaimer requirements.44 Upon formation, a political commit-
tee must register with the FEC by filing a statement of organization, as
well as appointing a treasurer responsible for the committee’s compli-
ance with the federal campaign finance laws.45 The key disclosure re-
quirement is a continuous reporting requirement.46 All committees
must file periodic reports with the FEC on a monthly, quarterly, or
semiannual basis47 that itemize all receipts and disbursements of the
committee exceeding $200.48 These reports must include the name,
address, and employer of each contributor and the amount of his or
her contribution.49 Finally, any public communications made by a po-
litical committee must display a disclaimer disclosing the name of the
committee and its address, telephone number, or website address.50
40. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (codified as
amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431–456 (2006)).
41. An expenditure is “independent” if it “is not made in concert or cooperation with
or at the request or suggestion of [a] candidate, the candidate’s authorized political com-
mittee, or their agents, or a political party committee or its agents.” 2 U.S.C. § 431(17)(B).
42. Id. §§ 432, 433, 434(a)–(b).
43. Id. § 434(c), (f).
44. Id. §§ 432, 433, 434(a)–(b).
45. Id. §§ 432, 433.
46. Id. § 434(a).
47. Id. § 434(a)(4).
48. Id. § 434(b)(3). Several types of receipts must be itemized regardless of amount,
including contributions from political committees, transfers from affiliated committees,
and loans received. 11 C.F.R. § 104.3(a)(4) (2011).
49. 2 U.S.C. § 434(b)(3), (h)(i)(1); see also id. § 431(13)(A) (defining “identification”
of individuals as meaning “the name, the mailing address, and the occupation of such
individual, as well as the name of his or her employer”).
50. Id. § 441d(a); 11 C.F.R. § 110.11(a)–(c).
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Importantly, however, the Supreme Court narrowed the scope of
permissible political committee regulation in Buckley v. Valeo.51 FECA
defines a federal “political committee” as any group that “receives con-
tributions” or “makes expenditures aggregating in excess of $1,000
during a calendar year.”52 Fearing that this definition raised over-
breadth and vagueness concerns, the Buckley Court limited the defini-
tion of political committee status to encompass only those
“organizations that are under the control of a candidate or the major
purpose of which is the nomination or election of a candidate.”53 The
disbursements of such “major purpose” groups, according to the
Court, can be regulated because they “can be assumed to fall within
the core area sought to be addressed by Congress.”54 Such disburse-
ments “are, by definition, campaign related.”55 Thus, since Buckley,
federal political committee status can only be imposed on those inde-
pendent groups whose major purpose is campaign-related. It should
be noted, however, that at the time Buckley was decided, political com-
mittee status entailed not only these disclosure requirements but also
strict limits and source restrictions on the contributions committees
could accept.56
For individuals and groups engaged in independent spending
that are not major purpose groups, FECA requires only ad-specific re-
ports in connection with two types of independent advertisements: IEs
and ECs.57
Since its enactment, FECA has required persons making IEs ex-
ceeding $250 in a calendar year to report these expenditures to the
51. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
52. 2 U.S.C. § 431(4)(A).
53. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 79 (emphasis added).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. In terms of fundraising, a “nonconnected” political committee must comply with a
$5000 contribution limit, 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)–(2), and a prohibition on corporate and
union contributions, id. § 441b(a). Notably, in 2010, the FEC authorized a subcategory of
political committees to operate without these fundraising constraints in response to Speech
Now.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010). There, the en banc D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals invalidated the federal contribution limits as applied to federal political commit-
tees that make only IEs and do not contribute to candidates or political parties. Following
this decision, the FEC made clear that political committees that make only independent
expenditures, colloquially dubbed “Super PACs,” are no longer bound by the federal con-
tribution and source restrictions. See Club for Growth, Advisory Op. 2010-09 (F.E.C. July 22,
2010); Commonsense Ten, Advisory Op. 2010-11 (F.E.C. July 22, 2010).
57. 2 U.S.C. § 434(c), (f).
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FEC and to include disclaimers on the advertisement.58 FECA origi-
nally defined “expenditure” as any disbursement “for the purpose of
influencing any election for Federal office.”59 The Supreme Court
found this definition overbroad and unconstitutionally vague with re-
spect to non-major purpose groups, however, and narrowly construed
the term to cover only “communications that expressly advocate the elec-
tion or defeat of a clearly identified candidate.”60 Thus, only express
advocacy advertisements give rise to the IE disclosure requirements.
An IE report typically must be filed at the end of the first calen-
dar quarter in which a person’s IEs exceed the $250 statutory thresh-
old and then in each subsequent quarter that year in which additional
IEs of any amount are made.61 The reports must disclose the identity
of the sponsor funding the express advocacy, the recipients of dis-
bursements for the ad, and each person who made a contribution of
over $200 to the ad sponsor “for the purpose of furthering an indepen-
dent expenditure.”62 This “for the purpose of furthering” language
present in one section of the statute63 significantly limits donor disclo-
sure, at least under the current FEC interpretation of the law, because
it requires only the disclosure of those contributors who have “fur-
thered” the group’s advertisements, not necessarily all donors to a
group engaged in campaign-related spending.64
The second type of independent advertisement that mixed-pur-
pose groups and individuals must disclose is ECs. Congress in 2002
enacted the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (“BCRA”)65 to regulate
ECs after the express advocacy construction of the IE disclosure provi-
58. Id. § 434(c)(1). IEs must also include disclaimers on the face of the ad disclosing
the sponsor’s name, address, telephone number, and World Wide Web address, but not
any of the donors to the sponsor group. Id. § 441d(a)(3).
59. Id. § 431(9)(A)(i) (defining “expenditure”).
60. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 79–80 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
61. 11 C.F.R. § 109.10(b) (2011); Instructions for Preparing FEC FORM 5, FEC, at 1
http://www.fec.gov/pdf/forms/fecfrm5i.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2011). IEs exceeding
$1000 in the twenty day window before an election must be reported within twenty-four
hours of the expenditure, 2 U.S.C. § 434(g)(1), and IEs exceeding $10,000 prior to this
twenty day window must also be reported within twenty-four hours, id. § 434(g)(2). Politi-
cal committees are also required to file these twenty-four hour reports in connection with
their independent expenditures. Id. § 434(g)(1)(A), (g)(2)(A).
62. 2 U.S.C. § 434(c)(2)(C) (emphasis added); see also id. § 434(c)(1).
63. Another section of FECA suggests that persons making IEs of over $250 are re-
quired to report all donors of over $200 in the reporting period. See 2 U.S.C. § 434(c)(1)
(cross-referencing id. § 434(b)(3)(A)).
64. 11 C.F.R. § 109.10(e)(1)(vi).
65. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codi-
fied in scattered sections of 2, 8, 18, 28, 36, and 47 U.S.C.).
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sions proved too narrow to capture the full range of campaign-related
advertising. ECs are defined as: (1) a broadcast, cable, or satellite com-
munication that clearly identifies a candidate for federal office; (2)
airs within thirty days of a primary election or convention or sixty days
of a general election; and (3) is targeted to the relevant electorate.66
The BCRA requires all persons and groups to report any pay-
ments for ECs exceeding $10,000 in a calendar year to the FEC within
twenty-four hours of the expenditure.67 The law sets forth two options
for this reporting. If the ECs are financed from a segregated bank
account with funds donated by individuals, the group sponsoring the
ad must disclose all contributors of $1000 or more to such account. On
the other hand, if the ECs were financed from the group’s general
treasury, the group is required to report all of its contributors of
$1000 or more.68 The BCRA thus omitted the narrowing “for the pur-
pose of furthering” language present in FECA’s independent expendi-
ture reporting provision and instead required comprehensive donor
disclosure.69
Unfortunately, in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in
Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.,70 the FEC in
2007 adopted a rule that effectively gutted the EC reporting require-
ments. Following Wisconsin Right to Life, the FEC initiated a rulemak-
ing to clarify, among other matters, the reporting requirements for
corporations and unions making ECs that the decision had newly au-
thorized. The final rule, however, did not adhere to the statutory lan-
guage in the BCRA that required the disclosure of all contributors to
persons and groups making ECs.71 Instead, the FEC imported the “for
the purpose of furthering” language from the IE reporting require-
ment and required corporations and unions to disclose only those
persons who contributed $1000 or more “for the purpose of furthering
electioneering communications.”72 In the Explanation and Justifica-
tion, the FEC further narrowed the reach of the rule by explaining
that only those donations that were “specifically designated for [ECs] by
66. See 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(i).
67. Id. § 434(f).
68. Id. § 434(f)(2)(F).
69. In addition to this reporting requirement, ECs are also subject to disclaimer re-
quirements similar to those applicable to independent expenditures. 2 U.S.C. § 441d(a).
70. 551 U.S. 449 (2007).
71. See 11 C.F.R. § 104.20(c)(9) (2011).
72. Id. (emphasis added).
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the donor” would meet this “purpose” standard.73 Thus, the final rule
compelled disclosure only of those contributors who affirmatively des-
ignated their contributions for the purpose of funding ECs. Any do-
nor who was silent as to the intended purpose of his or her
contributions could evade disclosure.
Further exacerbating the new loophole in the law, three of the
FEC’s six Commissioners refused even to enforce the regulation as
written. During a 2010 enforcement action against Freedom’s Watch,
these Commissioners blocked an investigation into the group’s failure
to provide donor disclosure. The Commissioners argued that the 2007
regulation required disclosure of only those donors who contributed
“for the purpose of furthering the electioneering communication that
is the subject of the [disclosure] report.”74 This ruling meant that only
those donors who indicated that their donation was for the purpose of
funding a specific EC, not the group’s ECs generally, would be subject
to disclosure. Because many ads are developed and aired only after an
advocacy group raises the funds to finance them, this interpretation of
the regulation effectively eliminates donor disclosure altogether.75
B. Application of Federal Campaign Finance Law to Mixed-
Purpose Groups
Although federal law established two tiers of disclosure require-
ments for independent spending, neither required disclosure of the
donors to many of the mixed-purpose 501(c) non-profit corporations
active in the 2010 elections.
As discussed above, the comprehensive disclosure requirements
for federal political committees are only applicable to major purpose
groups. Hence, groups that are mixed-purpose in nature—as claimed
by many of the 501(c) groups active in the 2010 election—cannot be
73. See Electioneering Communications, 72 Fed. Reg. 72,899, 72,911 (Dec. 26, 2007)
(to be codified at 11 C.F.R. pts. 104, 114) (emphasis added) (relating to the rules gov-
erning ECs).
74. Freedom’s Watch, Inc., MUR 6002, at 5 (F.E.C. Aug. 13, 2010), available at http://
eqs.nictusa.com/eqsdocsMUR/10044274536.pdf (emphasis added); see also Paul S. Ryan,
Citizens United and the ‘Effective Disclosure’ System That Wasn’t, CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER
BLOG (Jan. 24, 2011), http://www.clcblog.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=arti-
cle&id=412&Itemid=1 (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 434(c)(2)(C)).
75. In April 2010, U.S. Representative Chris Van Hollen (D-MD) filed a lawsuit chal-
lenging the FEC’s 2007 rule narrowing the EC reporting requirements, arguing that the
rule was arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law. See Complaint, Van Hollen v. FEC, No.
1:11-cv-00766-ABJ (D.D.C. Apr. 21, 2011). This case is pending before the U.S. District
Court of the District of Columbia. Attorneys from the Campaign Legal Center are co-coun-
sel for plaintiff.
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required to register as federal political committees. Only groups meet-
ing the major purpose test set forth in Buckley can constitutionally be
required to assume this status.
While the IE and EC reporting requirements do apply to mixed-
purpose groups, these reporting requirements were fatally weakened
by the FEC’s 2007 rule and subsequent FEC actions interpreting this
rule. An analysis by Public Citizen indicated that the percentage of
groups running ECs that disclosed their donors dropped from almost
97% in the 2006 elections to 49% in the 2008 elections following the
FEC’s 2007 rule and then dropped again to a dismal 34% in the 2010
elections.76
To conclude, mixed-purpose 501(c) non-profit corporations
evaded disclosure in 2010 because political committee disclosure did
not apply to non-major-purpose groups and more modest indepen-
dent spending disclosure requirements were rendered ineffective.
III. Constitutional Dimensions of Political Disclosure
The FEC’s feckless enforcement of the federal campaign finance
laws aside, the difficulty of ensuring meaningful disclosure of the in-
dependent campaign-related advocacy of mixed-purpose groups is not
attributable entirely to the agency’s failures. Further, the constitu-
tional ramifications of such laws are complicating attempts to craft
laws to require donor disclosure from such groups. The Supreme
Court has consistently approved greater regulation of campaign-related
advocacy rather than issue advocacy.77 Because a mixed-purpose
group, as defined here, engages in both types of speech, attempts to
obtain meaningful donor disclosure must take into account the
Court’s bifurcated analysis of issue speech versus campaign speech.
These constitutional concerns have prompted legal challenges to
legislative efforts to compel donor disclosure from mixed-purpose
groups. At least ten states are currently defending their disclosure laws
applicable to the independent campaign-related spending of mixed-
purpose groups and other persons in state elections.78 This Article
76. Disclosure Eclipse: Nearly Half of Outside Groups Kept Donors Secret in 2010; Top 10
Groups Revealed Sources of Only One in Four Dollars Spent, PUB. CITIZEN, 3 (Nov. 18, 2010),
http://www.citizen.org/documents/Eclipsed-Disclosure11182010.pdf.
77. See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 231–32 (2003); FEC v. Mass. Citizens for
Life, Inc. (MCFL), 479 U.S. 238, 249 (1986); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66 (1976).
78. See Nat’l Org. for Marriage v. Daluz, 654 F.3d 115 (1st Cir. 2011); Nat’l Org. for
Marriage v. McKee, 649 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2011); Vt. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell,
2:09-cv-00188 (D. Vt. filed Aug. 14, 2009); Iowa Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Tooker
(IRTL), 795 F. Supp. 2d 852 (S.D. Iowa 2011); Yamada v. Kuramoto, No. 10-00497, 2010
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takes the position that the lawsuits are unfounded and that these dis-
closure laws largely will be found constitutional, but this issue is still
under active dispute.
A. The Supreme Court’s Political Disclosure Jurisprudence
The Supreme Court has recognized that political disclosure re-
quirements have “the potential for substantially infringing the exer-
cise of First Amendment rights” and has required heightened
scrutiny.79 But because disclosure laws “impose no ceiling on cam-
paign-related activities,”80 and “do not prevent anyone from speak-
ing,”81 the Court has declined to subject disclosure to strict scrutiny.
Instead, it applies a relatively relaxed level of scrutiny, “exacting scru-
tiny,” which requires a “substantial relation” between the disclosure
requirement and a “sufficiently important” governmental interest.82
Pursuant to this standard of review, the Supreme Court has al-
most without exception upheld disclosure statutes connected to cam-
paign-related spending or spending that relates to the nomination or
election of a candidate for public office. The Court, however, has on
occasion turned a more skeptical eye to disclosure connected to politi-
cal “issue advocacy” or advocacy on political issues that is not related
to candidate election. To be sure, the line between campaign-related
speech and issue speech has sometimes proven difficult to draw83 and
WL 4603936 (D. Haw. Oct. 29, 2010), appeal dismissed, No. 10-17280 (9th Cir. June 10,
2011); Wis. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Myse, No. 10-C-0669, 2010 WL 3732300 (E.D. Wis.
Sept. 17, 2010) (order granting motion to abstain and stay); Minn. Citizens Concerned for
Life, Inc. v. Swanson, 741 F. Supp. 2d 1115 (D. Minn. 2010), aff’d, 640 F.3d 304 (8th Cir.
2011), vacated and reh’g en banc granted, (8th Cir. July 12, 2011); Ctr. for Individual Freedom
v. Madigan, 735 F. Supp. 2d 994 (N.D. Ill. 2010); Nat’l Org. for Marriage, Inc. v. Roberts,
No. 1:10-cv-00192 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 8, 2011) (“Roberts II”); Center for Individual Freedom,
Inc. v. Tennant, Nos. 1:08-cv-00190, 1:08-cv-01133, 2011 WL 2912735 (S.D. W. Va. July 18,
2011).
79. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66.
80. Id. at 64.
81. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 201 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).
82. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 914 (2010) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 231–32; see also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64–66.
83. The legal history of the evolving definitions of “issue advocacy” and “campaign-
related advocacy” is long and complicated, and somewhat tangential to the focus of this
Article.
With respect to political committees, i.e. organizations whose “major purpose” relates
to “the nomination or election of a candidate,” the Supreme Court has “assumed” that that
all their spending is campaign-related. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 79. As such, their activities can
permissibly be subject to comprehensive disclosure and contribution restrictions.
With respect to non-major purpose groups, the task of line drawing between cam-
paign-related advocacy and issue advocacy has been more difficult. In Buckley, the Court
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may “dissolve in practical application.”84 Nonetheless, one may fairly
state that the Court has approved far greater regulation of spending
connected to candidate elections than spending for issue advocacy.
Applying exacting scrutiny, the Supreme Court has upheld a wide
range of disclosure laws pertaining to campaign-related speech, in-
cluding disclosure requirements applicable to candidate, political
party, and independent political committees.85 In Buckley, the Court
set forth the three fundamental governmental interests generally
served by campaign finance disclosure. First, the Court noted that dis-
closure is substantially related to the governmental interest in
“provid[ing] the electorate with information as to where political cam-
paign money comes from.”86 This information in turn enables voters
to “place each candidate in the political spectrum more precisely than
is often possible solely on the basis of party labels and campaign
speeches” and “also alert[s] the voter to the interests to which a candi-
date is most likely to be responsive.”87 Second, disclosure laws “deter
suggested that the only independent speech that was sufficiently related to a candidate
election and therefore regulable was speech that “expressly advocate[d] the election or
defeat of a clearly identified candidate.” Id. at 79–80 (alteration in original) (footnote
omitted); see also MCFL, 479 U.S. 238, 249 (1986) (applying express advocacy construction
to federal corporate expenditure restriction). The BCRA then added “electioneering com-
munications” to the category of regulable campaign-related spending. Pub. L. No. 107-155,
116 Stat. 81 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 2, 8, 18, 28, 36, and 47 U.S.C). The
McConnell Court approved this addition, noting that the “vast majority” of ECs had an
“electioneering purpose.” McConnell, 540 U.S. at 193. McConnell thus rejected the notion
that disclosure could only constitutionally extend to express advocacy, noting that “the
express advocacy limitation . . . was the product of statutory interpretation rather than a
constitutional command.” Id. at 105, 191–92.
Although this case law suggests that the Supreme Court considers both IEs and ECs to
be campaign-related, its decision in Wisconsin Right to Life casts some doubt upon this classi-
fication. Applying strict scrutiny, the Court struck down the BCRA’s prohibition on the use
of corporate and union treasury funds to finance ECs as applied to any ECs that were not
the “functional equivalent of express advocacy.” FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL),
551 U.S. 449, 469–70 (2007). Although this holding suggests that some subcategory of ECs
are not campaign-related, the decision has since been superseded by the Citizens United
decision, which struck down all restrictions on corporate and union independent spend-
ing, even when such spending could be classified as “express advocacy” or “the functional
equivalent of express advocacy.” Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 915. Further, applying exact-
ing scrutiny, the Court in Citizens United upheld the EC disclosure requirements as to all
ECs regardless whether they constituted the functional equivalent of express advocacy. See
id. at 916. Consequently, although the parameters of what constitutes campaign-related
speech are less than certain, this precedent suggests that “campaign-related” speech, at the
least, includes IEs and the “vast majority” of ECs.
84. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 42.
85. Id. at 62–64; see also Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934) (upholding
the disclosure provisions of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925).
86. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66–67 (internal quotation mark omitted).
87. Id. at 67.
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actual corruption and avoid the appearance of corruption by expos-
ing large contributions and expenditures to the light of publicity.”88
Lastly, the Court has recognized that disclosure requirements are “an
essential means of gathering the data necessary to detect violations” of
the substantive campaign finance laws.89
Importantly, the Court has on at least three occasions specifically
upheld federal laws applicable to independent campaign-related spend-
ing by non-major purpose groups. In Buckley, the Court upheld
FECA’s IE disclosure requirements on the basis of the government’s
“informational” interest, finding that it “increase[d] the fund of infor-
mation concerning those who support the candidates” and “help[ed]
voters to define more of the candidates’ constituencies.”90 In McCon-
nell, the Supreme Court upheld the federal ECs disclosure require-
ments on their face, finding that all of the “important state interests
that prompted the Buckley Court to uphold FECA’s disclosure require-
ments—providing the electorate with information, deterring actual
corruption and avoiding any appearance thereof, and gathering the
data necessary to enforce more substantive electioneering restric-
tions” justified the BCRA’s disclosure requirements as to “the entire
range of ‘electioneering communications.’”91 In Citizens United, the
Court by an 8-1 margin again upheld the EC disclosure requirements
both facially and as-applied to certain commercial advertisements pro-
moting a campaign-related film.92 The Court focused principally on
the state’s “informational interest” in EC disclosure,93 noting that
“[t]he First Amendment protects political speech; and disclosure per-
mits citizens and shareholders to react to the speech of corporate enti-
ties in a proper way. This transparency enables the electorate to make
informed decisions and give proper weight to different speakers and
messages.”94
This series of Supreme Court decisions makes clear that disclo-
sure requirements connected to candidate elections—specifically inde-
pendent “campaign-related” spending—are constitutional. Less clear is
the constitutionality of disclosure in connection with political issue ad-
88. Id.
89. Id. at 68.
90. Id. at 81.
91. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 196 (2003).
92. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 914–16 (2010).
93. Because the Court found that the information interest alone was sufficient to jus-
tify the disclosure requirements, it found it “not necessary to consider the Government’s
other asserted interests.” Id. at 915–16.
94. Id. at 916.
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vocacy. As a general matter, the Supreme Court has recognized “a
respected tradition of anonymity in the advocacy of political causes.”95
Further, many forms of issue advocacy, such as ballot referenda cam-
paigns, do not raise the same corruption concerns as candidate elec-
tions.96 Accordingly, in Talley v. California, the Court struck down a
city ordinance requiring all handbills to include disclaimers disclosing
the names and addresses of their sponsors on grounds that such an
identification requirement “would tend to restrict freedom to dis-
tribute information and thereby freedom of expression.”97 In a similar
vein, in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, the Court declared un-
constitutional an Ohio statute requiring ballot initiative literature to
include a disclaimer identifying the literature’s sponsor.98
Further, in its campaign finance case law, the Supreme Court has
also discussed the goal of shielding issue speech from undue regula-
tion. In Buckley, the Court formulated the express advocacy test to nar-
row the federal independent expenditure reporting requirements
because it feared that the original definition of “expenditure” poten-
tially “encompass[ed] both issue discussion and advocacy of a political
result.”99 Similarly, the Court established the major purpose test be-
cause it had concerns that the original statutory definition of political
committee could be interpreted “to reach groups engaged purely in
issue discussion.”100
The Supreme Court’s concern with disclosure in connection with
issue advocacy, however, has been balanced by its recognition of the
informational benefits of such disclosure. Although the Court struck
down disclaimer requirements for ballot initiative literature in McIn-
tyre, it has expressed approval of statutes requiring the disclosure of
expenditures or contributions connected to advocacy for and against
ballot initiatives.101 Indeed, the Court’s support for financial disclo-
95. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 343 (1995).
96. See, e.g., Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found. (Buckley II), 525 U.S. 182, 203
(1999) (“[B]allot initiatives do not involve the risk of ‘quid pro quo’ corruption present
when money is paid to, or for, candidates.”).
97. 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960).
98. 514 U.S. at 357.
99. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 78–79 (1976) (emphasis added).
100. Id. at 79 (emphasis added).
101. In First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, the Court struck down a restriction on
corporate expenditures to influence ballot measures, but did so in part because
“[i]dentification of the source of advertising may be required as a means of disclosure, so
that the people will be able to evaluate the arguments to which they are being subjected.”
435 U.S. 765, 792 n.32 (1978). Citing Buckley, the Court took note of “the prophylactic
effect of requiring that the source of communication be disclosed.” Id.
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sure in connection with ballot initiative campaigns has been so consis-
tent that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has declared that
“[g]iven the Supreme Court’s repeated pronouncements, we think
there can be no doubt that states may regulate express ballot-measure
advocacy through disclosure laws.”102 The Court has also endorsed
compelled disclosure in connection with issue advocacy in other con-
texts. It has upheld laws requiring disclosure of the financing of lobby-
ing activity, recognizing Congress’ interests in gathering information
about “those who for hire attempt to influence legislation,” and in
protecting the “integrity of a basic governmental process.”103 Further,
it has upheld provisions of the Federal Communications Act of 1934
requiring broadcasters to collect and make public information regard-
ing the sponsors of political advertising.104
This Supreme Court case law hardly suggests that issue advocacy
is so sacrosanct as to render any applicable disclosure law unconstitu-
tional. Nevertheless, it is clear that some forms of political issue
speech105 have received greater protection from compelled disclosure
than has campaign-related spending to influence candidate elections.
The Court again recognized this state “informational interest” in Citizens Against Rent
Control v. City of Berkeley, where it considered a challenge to the City’s ordinance that lim-
ited contributions to committees formed to support or oppose ballot measures. 454 U.S.
290 (1981). Although the Court struck down the contribution limit, it noted the disclosure
that the law already required from ballot measure committees. See id. at 298 (“[T]here is
no risk that the Berkeley voters will be in doubt as to the identity of those whose money
supports or opposes a given ballot measure since contributors must make their identities
known under [a different section] of the ordinance, which requires publication of lists of
contributors in advance of the voting.”).
102. Cal. Pro-Life Council, Inc. v. Getman, 328 F.3d 1088, 1104 (9th Cir. 2003), appeal
after remand sub nom. Cal. Pro-Life Council, Inc. v. Randolph, 507 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2007).
103. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625 (1954) (upholding the Federal Regula-
tion of Lobbying Act); see also Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Taylor, 582 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
(dismissing the First Amendment challenge to a federal lobbying disclosure law).
104. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 236, 240 (2003) (upholding the Communications
Act requirement that television broadcasters maintain records of requests to broadcast
“message[s]” about “a national legislative issue of public importance” or “any political mat-
ter of national importance,” and to make such records available to the public); see also 47
U.S.C. § 315(e)(1) (2006).
105. In the sphere of issue advocacy, the Court appears most concerned with disclosure
laws that could potentially subject individual speakers to direct, in-person reprisals or
threats, such as the disclaimer requirements in McIntyre, or the requirement in Buckley II
that petition circulators wear a badge disclosing their names in face-to-face interactions.
Buckley II, 525 U.S. 182, 199 (1999) (“[T]he badge requirement compels personal name
identification at the precise moment when the circulator’s interest in anonymity is great-
est.”); see also Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150,
154–56, 164 (2002) (striking down a statute that required door-to-door canvassers to ob-
tain a permit from the village and display upon demand the permit containing canvasser’s
name). The Court distinguished these types of disclosure laws from the campaign finance
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B. The Constitutionality of Compelled Disclosure in Connection
with Mixed-Purpose Groups
The application of disclosure requirements to mixed-purpose
groups (i.e., those groups that engage in both electoral and issue ad-
vocacy) straddles the divide between campaign-related advocacy and
issue advocacy in the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurispru-
dence. The Supreme Court has not provided any definitive guidance
on the question of how much disclosure can be required from mixed-
purpose groups whose major purpose does not relate to candidate
elections.
On the one hand, under Buckley it is clear that federal political
committee status, and its attendant disclosure requirements and con-
tribution restrictions, can be imposed only on major purpose groups.
On the other hand, the federal EC disclosure requirements,
which apply to non-major-purpose groups, have been twice upheld.
Indeed, these requirements won approval from the Court in McCon-
nell although the statute, prior to the adoption of the 2007 FEC regu-
lation, required groups making ECs to report all their donors if they
did not use a segregated fund. The Court in McConnell was thus appar-
ently untroubled by the possibility that the BCRA’s disclosure require-
ments may have required the disclosure of some donors who did not
earmark their money for campaign-related ads. Indeed, the Court in
both McConnell and Citizens United acknowledged that the definition of
an EC itself may encompass some amount of issue advocacy, as it ex-
tends the quantum of regulable speech beyond express advocacy. For
instance, in upholding the EC disclosure requirements on an as-ap-
plied basis, the Court in Citizens United explicitly rejected the argu-
ment that disclosure requirements must be “confined to speech that is
the functional equivalent of express advocacy.”106 In so holding, the
Court suggested that the disclosure requirements were constitutional
even as to some amount of issue advocacy, noting that the Court previ-
ously “upheld registration and disclosure requirements on lobbyists,
even though Congress has no power to ban lobbying itself.”107
This mixed guidance from the Supreme Court appears to have
encouraged opponents of campaign finance to challenge the constitu-
disclosure considered in Buckley on grounds that campaign finance disclosure is “less spe-
cific, less personal, and less provocative than a handbill . . . when money supports an un-
popular viewpoint it is less likely to precipitate retaliation.” McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 355 (1995).
106. 130 S. Ct. 876, 915 (2010).
107. Id.
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tionality of state laws that require comprehensive donor disclosure
from mixed-purpose groups following the Citizens United ruling. To
date, however, most courts support these disclosure laws.
Opponents of such laws make two interrelated arguments. First,
they argue that requiring comprehensive donor disclosure of the in-
dependent spending of mixed-purpose groups is tantamount to im-
posing full political committee status on such groups. For this reason,
opponents argue that disclosure laws should be subject to strict scru-
tiny, instead of exacting scrutiny. This argument has been particularly
prevalent in cases concerning “PAC-style” state disclosure laws that re-
quire mixed-purpose groups engaging in campaign-related spending
to comply with some of the organizational and reporting require-
ments applicable to federal political committees, as will be discussed
in further detail in Part IV.A. infra.
This demand for strict scrutiny has not been well-received by
lower courts. Although there was some confusion regarding the
proper level of review applicable to disclosure prior to Citizens
United,108 that decision confirmed that disclosure laws warranted only
exacting scrutiny. Accordingly, in the wake of Citizens United, virtually
all courts reviewing independent spending disclosure laws applicable
to independent spending have declined to apply strict scrutiny to the
challenged laws.109
108. See, e.g., Human Life of Wash. Inc. v. Brumsickle, 624 F.3d 990, 1005 (9th Cir.
2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1477 (2011) (noting that “[r]ecent Supreme Court decisions
have eliminated the apparent confusion as to the standard of review applicable in disclo-
sure cases” by “clarify[ing] that a campaign finance disclosure requirement is constitu-
tional if it survives exacting scrutiny”).
109. See Nat’l Org. for Marriage v. McKee, 649 F.3d 34, 56 (1st Cir. 2011) (“Because
Maine’s PAC laws do not prohibit, limit, or impose any onerous burdens on speech, but
merely require the maintenance and disclosure of certain financial information, we reject
NOM’s argument that strict scrutiny should apply.”); Human Life of Wash., 624 F.3d at
997–98, 1005 (applying exacting scrutiny to state disclosure law that required groups that
supported or opposed candidates or ballot propositions to register and report as political
committees); Roberts II, No. 1:10-cv-00192, slip op. at 9 (finding that Florida disclosure
requirements connected to ECs organizations “would not prohibit [plaintiff] from engag-
ing in its proposed speech” and were subject only to exacting scrutiny); IRTL, 795 F. Supp.
2d 852 (S.D. Iowa 2011) (finding that Iowa disclosure requirements connected to “inde-
pendent expenditure committees” were subject to exacting scrutiny); Yamada v. Kuramoto,
No. 10-00497, 2010 WL 4603936, at *11 (D. Haw. Oct. 29, 2010), appeal dismissed, No. 10-
17280 (9th Cir. June 10, 2011) (finding that recent case law “leaves no doubt [that] exact-
ing scrutiny applies” to Hawaii’s regulation of non-candidate committees); see also Speech
Now.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied 131 S. Ct. 553 (2010) (applying
exacting scrutiny to uphold federal political committee organizational, reporting, and dis-
claimer requirements as applied to a committee making only IEs).
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Second, opponents have also seized upon the major purpose test,
arguing that because comprehensive disclosure requirements are
comparable to imposing PAC status, the requirements are unconstitu-
tional as applied to mixed-purpose groups.110
Lower courts have split on this issue although many of the rele-
vant decisions since Citizens United have upheld PAC-style comprehen-
sive disclosure requirements for mixed-purpose groups engaged in
independent campaign-related advocacy.
In Human Life of Washington, Inc. v. Brumsickle, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld Washington State’s public dis-
closure law that required groups supporting or opposing candidates
or ballot propositions to register as political committees and to satisfy
detailed reporting and organizational requirements.111 Human Life
complained that these disclosure requirements applied if only “one of
the primary purposes” of a group was to support or oppose candidates
or ballot propositions, which it argued did not meet Buckley’s major
purpose test.112 But the Ninth Circuit “rejected the notion that the
First Amendment categorically prohibits the government from impos-
ing disclosure requirements on groups with more than one ‘major
purpose’” and approved comprehensive disclosure for mixed-purpose
groups.113 It further cited the Fourth Circuit for the proposition that
application of the “major purpose” test would “effectively en-
courage[ ] advocacy groups to circumvent the law by not creating po-
litical action committees and instead to hide their electoral advocacy
from view by pulling it into the fold of their larger organizational
structure.”114
Similarly, since Citizens United, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the
First Circuit,115 and several federal district courts, have upheld or de-
clined to enjoin laws that imposed comprehensive PAC-style disclo-
110. McKee, 649 F.3d at 59; Roberts II, No. 1:10-cv-00192, slip op. at 10; IRTL, 795 F.
Supp. 2d at 867 n.29 (rejecting the claim that “that a state may not impose ‘PAC-style
burdens’ on an organization unless that organization has the major purpose of making
independent expenditures”).
111. 624 F.3d at 997–98.
112. Id. at 1008–09 (emphasis added).
113. Id. at 1011.
114. Id. at 1012 (quoting N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274, 332 (4th Cir.
2008) (Michael, J., dissenting)).
115. The U.S. Court of Appeals for Eighth Circuit also upheld Minnesota’s “PAC-style”
disclosure law on May 16, 2011, but this decision was vacated on July 12, 2011 when the
Court of Appeals granted appellants’ request for an en banc rehearing. Minn. Citizens
Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson, 640 F.3d 304 (8th Cir. 2011), vacated and reh’g en banc
granted (8th Cir. July 12, 2011). The case is still pending before the en banc court.
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sure on mixed-purpose groups engaging in campaign-related
independent spending.116 These courts have recognized that the ma-
jor purpose test was formulated to narrow the specific federal defini-
tion of “political committee.” As the First Circuit stated, “We find no
reason to believe that this so-called ‘major purpose’ test, like the other
narrowing constructions adopted in Buckley, is anything more than an
artifact of the Court’s construction of a federal statute.”117 Lower
courts have also recognized that federal political committees are sub-
ject to regulatory burdens that extend well beyond disclosure, includ-
ing strict contribution limits and contribution source restrictions, and
have declined to impose a major purpose test on the state disclosure-
only statues on this ground.118
By contrast, the Fourth Circuit in North Carolina Right to Life, Inc.
v. Leake (“NCRTL”)119 and the Tenth Circuit in New Mexico Youth Or-
ganized v. Herrera (“NMYO”)120 and Colorado Right to Life Committee, Inc.
v. Coffman (“CRTL”),121 have declared unconstitutional state statutes
that imposed political committee status on non-major purpose
groups. In 2008, in North Carolina Right to Life v. Leake, for instance,
the Fourth Circuit struck down a North Carolina law that defined a
“political committee” as a group that had influencing elections as “a
major purpose,” not “the major purpose.”122 However, in many of
these cases the state statutes under review extended beyond basic dis-
closure requirements and imposed additional substantive require-
ments on “political committees.” For example, in evaluating North
Carolina’s definition of “political committee,” the Fourth Circuit spe-
cifically noted that “political committees” were not only subject to dis-
closure requirements under North Carolina law, but also “face[d]
limits on the amount of donations they can receive in any one elec-
tion cycle from any individual or entity.”123 Similarly, “political com-
116. Nat’l Org. for Marriage v. McKee, 649 F.3d 34, 59 (1st Cir. 2011); Nat’l Org. for
Marriage, Inc. v. Roberts, 753 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1222 (N.D. Fla. 2010) (“Roberts I”) (not-
ing that “[t]here is no major purpose requirement because the [disclosure] statutes do not
impose full-fledged political-committee like burdens upon NOM”); IRTL, 795 F. Supp. 2d
at 867 n.29 (S.D. Iowa 2011) (rejecting claim “that a state may not impose ‘PAC-style bur-
dens’ on an organization unless that organization has the major purpose of making inde-
pendent expenditures”).
117. McKee, 649 F.3d at 59.
118. Id. at 55–56; Roberts I, 753 F. Supp. 2d at 1222.
119. 525 F.3d at 287.
120. 611 F.3d 669, 678 (10th Cir. 2010).
121. 498 F.3d 1137, 1153–54 (10th Cir. 2007); see also S.C. Citizens for Life, Inc. v.
Krawcheck, 759 F. Supp. 2d 708 (D.S.C. 2010).
122. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.6(14) (2007); NCRTL, 525 F.3d at 289–90.
123. NCRTL, 525 F.3d at 286.
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mittee” status as provided by the Colorado statute under review by the
Tenth Circuit in CRTL entailed not only disclosure, but also strict con-
tribution requirements.124 Therefore, to some extent, the decisions of
the Fourth and Tenth Circuits enforcing the major purpose test in-
volved state statutes that extended beyond basic disclosure require-
ments and imposed substantive contribution restrictions on political
committees.125 Thus, there is a strong argument that even compre-
hensive PAC-style disclosure-only laws pass First Amendment muster.
IV. A New Transparency
Although Citizens United ushered in an era of undisclosed cam-
paign-related spending, the decision—and the unequivocal support of
eight Justices for transparency—also presents an opportunity to im-
prove the federal campaign finance disclosure regime, which, as this
Article has hopefully made clear, was in disrepair even prior to the
Supreme Court’s decision.
There are a variety of models that have been developed at the
federal and state level to ensure disclosure of the donors to mixed-
purpose groups engaged in independent campaign-related advocacy.
More precisely, the goal would be to create a well-tailored law that
“captures” all donors whose contributions are intended for use, or ac-
tually are used, for campaign-related ads, while minimizing the disclo-
sure connected to any issue advocacy done by a mixed-purpose group.
This Part discusses three models for campaign finance reporting:
(1) PAC-style disclosure; (2) the “dedicated account” model; and (3)
the “presumption of donor intent” model. It also assesses the different
legislative models, both in terms of practical effectiveness and consti-
tutionality. To be sure, policymakers are considering other ap-
proaches outside of the sphere of campaign finance law to improve
political transparency; for instance, tax law reform or corporate gov-
ernance measures requiring shareholder notification or approval of
124. CRTL, 498 F.3d 1137. The district court in CRTL noted that “political committees
are prohibited from accepting contributions or dues from any person in excess of five
hundred dollars per house of representatives election cycle.” Colo. Right to Life Comm.,
Inc. v. Davidson, 395 F. Supp. 2d 1001, 1019–20 (D. Colo. 2005) (citing COLO. CONST. art.
XXVIII, § 3(5)).
125. In NMYO, the Tenth Circuit held that New Mexico’s political committee disclo-
sure law that applied to any group that made a contribution of over $500 for “political
purposes” was unconstitutional because it required non-major purpose groups to comply
with comprehensive reporting and organizational requirements. 611 F.3d at 679. This case,
however, is the outlier in this area of the law, and involved the regulation of two groups
which arguably did not make any campaign-related expenditures at all. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\S\SAN\46-2\SAN205.txt unknown Seq: 26 14-FEB-12 17:34
450 UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46
corporate political spending.126 But this Part will focus on approaches
in the sphere of campaign finance law to obtain meaningful disclo-
sure from mixed-purpose groups.
A. PAC-style Disclosure Model
The most comprehensive solution to the issue of donor disclo-
sure in connection with mixed-purpose groups is the enactment of a
PAC-style disclosure law. Several states, including Florida, Iowa,
Maine, and Minnesota have passed statutes that require groups to (1)
register a committee or political fund with the state election authority
in order to make campaign-related expenditures and then (2) provide
regular disclosure of the financial activities of the committee or
fund.127 In essence, these laws require groups that run independent
campaign-related ads to comply with some of the key reporting and
organizational requirements applicable to federal political commit-
tees, without imposing any of the substantive restrictions associated
with PAC status, such as contribution restrictions.
For example, Minnesota amended its law following Citizens United
to permit corporations to make IEs from their treasury funds to influ-
ence state elections.128 But the law also provides that an association
“that makes only independent expenditures and disbursements . . .
must do so by forming and registering an independent expenditure
political fund if the expenditure is in excess of $100 or by contribut-
ing to an existing independent expenditure political committee or po-
litical fund.”129 Importantly, however, use of a political fund to make
126. In the sphere of corporate governance, the Shareholder Protection Act intro-
duced by U.S. Representative Michael E. Capuano (D-MA) in the 111th Congress, and
again in the 112th Congress, would require corporations to notify their shareholders of
their proposed political activities each fiscal year and obtain prior approval from their
shareholders. H.R. 4537, 111th Cong. (2010); H.R. 2517, 112th Cong. (2011).
127. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 106.03, 106.0703 (West 2008 & Supp. 2011) (requiring
groups receiving contributions or making expenditures for “electioneering communica-
tions” exceeding $5000 in a year to file a statement of organization and regular disclosure
reports); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 68A.402B(3), 68A.404(3)–(4) (West Supp. 2011); IOWA AD-
MIN. CODE r. 351-4.9(15) (2011) (requiring a group making more than $750 in IEs to file
statement as an “independent expenditure committee” as well as regular reports); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, §§ 1052(5), 1053, 1059 (2008 & Supp. 2011) (requiring a non-major
purpose organization that spends more than $5000 in a year “for the purpose of promot-
ing, defeating or influencing in any way the nomination or election of any candidate to
political office” to register a PAC and report); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 10A.12(1a), 10A.121,
10A.13, 10A.14, 10A.20 (West 2005 & Supp. 2011) (requiring associations that make more
than $100 in IEs to register a “political fund” and file regular disclosure).
128. See 2010 MINN. LAWS 2001-08.
129. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 10A.12(1a) (emphasis added).
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campaign-related expenditures does not subject a corporation or asso-
ciation to any substantive restrictions on either its IEs or its fundrais-
ing to finance such expenditures.
To form a political fund, a corporation must register a fund with
the state and appoint a treasurer, but need not create a separate bank
account if the fund is financed only with general treasury money.130
An IE political fund must file regular reports with the state131 that
disclose all of the fund’s receipts and disbursements, including the
name and address of each contributor of over $100 within the year
and the amount and date of the contributions.132 To dissolve, a politi-
cal fund must settle its debts, dispose of its remaining assets, and file a
termination report.133
The advantage of the PAC-style disclosure model is that due to its
comprehensive nature, it is not easily gamed by regulated entities. For
instance, Minnesota law requires associations to make all campaign-
related expenditures through a political fund that must disclose all
contributions it receives of over $100.134 This statute includes no “in-
tent” language (e.g., “for the purpose of furthering electioneering
communications”) with respect to contributors to the fund that would
allow evasion of disclosure. But because this model requires disclosure
of only those persons or entities whose contributions in fact funded
the group’s IE committee or fund, it is tailored to avoid disclosure of
those donors whose money supported only a group’s non-campaign-
related issue advocacy or other activities.
The drawback of this model is that it has drawn legal challenges
on grounds that PAC-style reporting should be held to strict scrutiny
or limited to groups whose major purpose is the nomination or elec-
tion of a candidate. The disclosure laws of Florida, Iowa, Maine, and
Minnesota have all been challenged.135 But, as discussed in Part III.B.
130. Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson, 741 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1122
(D. Minn. 2010). If, alternatively, a corporation were to contribute to an external indepen-
dent expenditure fund, then the recipient fund would have the disclosure obligation and
would report the contribution from the corporation in its regular reporting to the state. Id.
at 1121–22.
131. A political fund must file five reports during a general election year and one re-
port during a non-general election year. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 10A.20(2).
132. Id. §§ 10A.12(1a), 10A.13, 10A.14, 10A.20.
133. Id. § 10A.24.
134. Id. §§ 10A.12(1a), 10A.20.
135. See Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson, 640 F.3d 304 (8th Cir.
2011), vacated and reh’g en banc granted (8th Cir. July 12, 2011); Nat’l Org. for Marriage v.
McKee, 649 F.3d 34, 59 (1st Cir. 2011); Roberts I, 753 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1222 (N.D. Fla.
2010); IRTL, 795 F. Supp. 2d 852, 867 n.29 (S.D. Iowa 2011).
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supra, the legal basis for these challenges is questionable. Few courts
have found merit to the assertion that PAC-style disclosure laws are
tantamount to expenditure bans or subject to strict scrutiny. Nor have
many courts agreed that the major purpose test is a prerequisite to
disclosure-only statutes.136 However, the challenges to these laws, in-
cluding Minnesota’s statute, are still ongoing, and thus this question
has not yet been definitively resolved.
B. Dedicated Account Model
A second and related model of disclosure is to require mixed-
purpose groups to finance any election advocacy through a dedicated
fund or account and to report the source of the funds deposited into
this account when the group finances campaign-related ads.
The foremost example of a “dedicated fund” law is the DIS-
CLOSE Act.137 In 2010, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the
bill, but the DISCLOSE Act twice failed to clear a filibuster in the
Senate—effectively falling short by just a single vote.138
The DISCLOSE Act creates incentives for corporations and other
mixed-purpose groups to use a segregated account for all campaign-
related activity. In a sense, the bill restores the federal EC disclosure
provisions to their original form prior to the FEC’s adoption of its
2007 regulation.
The DISCLOSE Act provides covered groups—including corpo-
rations, and 501(c)(4), (5), (6) and 527 organizations139—with two
reporting options in the event they expend more than the statutory
threshold amount for “campaign-related activity.”140 First, the group
136. McKee, 649 F.3d at 59; Roberts I, 753 F. Supp. 2d at 1222; IRTL, 795 F. Supp. 2d at
867 n.29.
137. DISCLOSE Act, H.R. 5175, 111th Cong. (2010).
138. See S. 3628, 111th Cong. (2010); 156 CONG. REC. H4828 (daily ed. June 24, 2010);
156 CONG. REC. S7388 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 2010); see also Editorial, Campaign Money to Burn,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/05/opinion/05fri3.html?scp
=6&sq=disclose%20act%20filibuster&st=cse.
139. H.R. 5175 § 211 (adding 2 U.S.C. §§ 434(g)(5)(G), 434(g)(6)(F)).
140. The DISCLOSE Act defines “campaign-related activity” as (1) an IE, a transfer of
funds to another person for the purpose of making such an expenditure, or a transfer of
funds “deemed” to have been made for the purpose of making such an expenditure; or (2)
an EC, transfer of funds for the purpose of making an EC, or a transfer of funds “deemed”
to have been made for the purpose of making such a communication. Id. § 212 (adding 2
U.S.C. § 325(d)(2)(A)).
Importantly, the DISCLOSE Act would have also expanded FECA’s definition of IEs to
include both express advocacy and the functional equivalent of express advocacy, and the
definition of ECs to include all broadcast ads that refer to a candidate within the period
beginning 120 days before a general election. Id. §§ 201(a), 202(a).
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has the option of establishing a dedicated account—i.e., a “Campaign-
Related Activity Account”—to finance such activity.141 If the group fi-
nances its campaign-related activity exclusively through this account,
then the group is required to disclose only the contributions in this
account.142 Alternatively, if a group uses its general treasury to fund its
campaign-related activity, or transfers funds from its general treasury
into its Campaign-Related Activity Account, it has to report all the
contributors to the group above certain thresholds.143 The DISCLOSE
Act thus grants the covered group a choice as to its disclosure method.
Significantly, the DISCLOSE Act treats transfers of funds between
groups for the purpose of funding IEs or ECs as disclosable “cam-
paign-related activity.”144 Thus, if a covered group transfers money to
another group for the purpose of funding the transferee group’s cam-
paign-related ads, the transferor group, subject to certain exceptions,
is required to disclose the sources of its transferred funds in the same
manner as if it had spent the funds directly for campaign-related
ads.145 This feature of the Act addresses the “Russian doll” problem,
wherein a group conceals its donors by transferring money to another
group—or a series of groups—for the purpose of funding the recipi-
ent group’s campaign-related ads.
There are numerous advantages of the DISCLOSE Act model. It
is more streamlined than the PAC-style disclosure model and does not
require the registration of a committee nor compliance with organiza-
tional requirements, such as appointment of a treasurer. Further-
more, the reporting requirement in the dedicated account model is
ad-specific, and, like the existing federal IE and EC disclosure require-
ments, is triggered when a group makes expenditures on campaign-
related ads that exceed the statutory threshold amount. This stands in
contrast to the ongoing reporting obligation required under a PAC-
style disclosure law that continues for the life of the political commit-
tee or fund.
At the same time, this model achieves the principal objective of
disclosure identified by this Article, namely disclosure of the donors
who fund the campaign-related ads of mixed-purpose groups. Because
the reporting requirement is ad-specific, instead of continuous, some
information regarding the financial activities of the regulated groups
141. Id. § 213 (adding 2 U.S.C. § 326).
142. Id.
143. Id. § 211(a)–(b).
144. Id. § 212 (adding 2 U.S.C. § 325(d)(2)(A)).
145. Id. § 211 (adding 2 U.S.C. §§ 434(g)(5)(B), 434(f)(6)(B)).
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may be sacrificed. Care will have to be given to setting monetary
thresholds that are neither so high as to miss significant campaign-
related spending, nor so low as to require disclosure of de minimis
activity or small donors. However, the nature of the reporting require-
ment also ensures that a group’s campaign-related advertising is the
focus of the disclosure, instead of the group’s issue advocacy or other
activities.
Despite the narrow tailoring of this model, the DISCLOSE Act
would likely draw legal challenges if enacted, and opponents would
likely raise the same strict scrutiny and major purpose arguments that
have been raised in existing challenges to state PAC-style disclosure
laws. Thus, enactment of a “dedicated fund” law will not likely obviate
the risk of litigation although these laws would likely withstand consti-
tutional attack.
C. Presumption of Donor Intent
Finally, a third method to secure disclosure in connection with
mixed-purpose groups is to establish a standard or presumption of
donor intent. This model does not require the recipient organization
to segregate contributions to be used for campaign activity from its
general treasury, but rather focuses on determining ex ante which
contributions to a mixed-purpose group are “campaign-related.”
One example of this model is a California State campaign finance
regulation known as the “first bite of the apple” rule.146 The regula-
tion provides that a “contribution” includes:
Any payment made to a person or organization other than a candi-
date or committee, when, at the time of making the payment, the
donor knows or has reason to know that the payment, or funds with
which the payment will be commingled, will be used to make con-
tributions or expenditures . . . .147
The regulation further establishes a rebuttable presumption that
a donor knows that his or her payment will be used to make contribu-
tions or expenditures if the recipient organization “made expendi-
tures or contributions of at least one thousand dollars ($1,000) in the
aggregate during the calendar year in which the payment occurs, or
146. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 18215(b)(1) (2011); see also Cal. Pro-Life Council, Inc. v.
Randolph (CPLC), 507 F.3d 1172, 1181 (9th Cir. 2007), abrogation recognized by Human Life
of Wash. Inc. v. Brumsickle, 624 F.3d 990, 1004–05 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting that CPLC court
incorrectly applied strict scrutiny to disclosure law at issue, but appropriate standard was
“exacting scrutiny”).
147. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 18215(b)(1) (emphasis added).
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any of the immediately preceding four calendar years.”148 The regula-
tion defines a contribution and/or expenditure in this context as a
payment for the purpose of influencing “the nomination or election
of a candidate or candidates” or “the qualification or passage of any
[ballot] measure.”149 Thus, once the organization has made a first bite
political contribution or expenditure, all of its donors thereafter are
presumed to know or have reason to know that their donations will be
used for political purposes and potentially subject to disclosure.
Interestingly, California law provides that one disclosure option
for a mixed-purpose organization is to report the sources of all of its
receipts of over $1000 that are presumed to be contributions, but only
after those contributions have been apportioned based on the per-
centage of the organization’s receipts expended for political pur-
poses.150 Essentially, it creates a system of pro rata reporting. The
California Fair Political Practices Commission illustrated this system
by describing a hypothetical organization that raised a total of $40,000
annually but contributed a quarter of its receipts ($10,000) to candi-
dates and committees during this time. If the threshold for donor re-
porting is $100, then “[a]ny person who donates $400 or more to [the
organization] during this time period must be itemized . . . since one
quarter of their donations are deemed contributions to the commit-
tee . . . .”151 By allowing apportionment, the regulation takes into ac-
count the possibility that the organization may be engaged in mixed
activities and that donors are funding multiple purposes.
The first bite of the apple regulation was upheld in large part in
California Pro-Life Council v. Randolph (“CPLC”).152 In that case, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the claim of a mixed-purpose
501(c)(4) organization that the presumption was overbroad and vio-
lated the First Amendment under strict scrutiny review.153
148. Id. § 18215; CPLC, 507 F.3d at 1185.
149. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, §§ 18215(a)(1) (defining contribution); id. § 18225(a)(1)
(defining expenditure).
150. Id. § 18215(b)(1).
151. CPLC, 507 F.3d at 1182 n.14 (quoting California Fair Political Practices Commis-
sion, Ginger Osborne Advice Letter, No. A-03-108 (“Osborne Advice Letter”), at 2 (June
11, 2003)).
152. Id. at 1184–87.
153. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the presumption, but struck down the
specific PAC-style reporting and organizational requirements applicable to the plaintiff or-
ganization as a result of this presumption. Id. at 1186–87. This holding turned on the fact
that the plaintiff engaged only in ballot measure advocacy, but the court found that PAC-
style comprehensive disclosure was appropriate only for groups engaged in advocacy for or
against candidates. Id. at 1187. The court, however, found that the plaintiff could be re-
quired to report in an event-specific manner its expenditures of over $1000, including
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A second example of a presumption of donor intent is the FEC’s
former “solicitation rule.” This rule provided that a donation made
“in response to any communication” would be a “contribution” sub-
ject to federal campaign finance law “if the communication indicates
that any portion of the funds received will be used to support or op-
pose the election of a clearly identified Federal candidate.”154 The
rule thus established the presumption that donations made in re-
sponse to solicitations that “plainly seek funds ‘for the purpose of in-
fluencing Federal elections’” were “contributions” and would be
subject to disclosure.155
The solicitation rule was challenged as unconstitutionally vague
and overbroad. Although several courts upheld the rule,156 the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals in EMILY’s List v. Federal Election Commission
found it unconstitutional insofar as it subjected a federal political
committee with federal and non-federal accounts to the federal con-
tribution limits.157 Although this holding did not, for instance, con-
sider whether the rule was permissible for the purpose of triggering
disclosure, the FEC repealed the rule in response to the decision.158
The California regulation and former FEC solicitation regulation
stand in contrast to the PAC-style model and the dedicated account
model because, by focusing on donor intent, these regulations require
very little organizational restructuring on the part of a mixed-purpose
group. Instead, both regulations create a standard for establishing do-
reporting all of the donors presumed to be “contributors” under the regulation. Id. Follow-
ing CPLC, the state election agency promulgated a new regulation to implement this part
of the decision, granting 501(c)(3) and (c)(4) organizations that engaged only in ballot
measure advocacy the option of disclosing by filing an “event-based” independent expendi-
ture report, instead of complying with full PAC reporting and organizational require-
ments. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 18413 (2011).
However, it is important to note that the CPLC holding resulted from the improper
application of strict scrutiny to the disclosure law, as the Ninth Circuit subsequently recog-
nized in Human Life of Wash., 624 F.3d at 1004–05. Arguably, the Ninth Circuit would hold
differently if it considered a comparable reporting requirement in the context of candi-
date elections under exacting scrutiny today.
154. 11 C.F.R. § 100.57(a) (2011).
155. See 69 Fed. Reg. 68,056, 68,057 (Nov. 23, 2004) (to be codified at 11 C.F.R. pts.
100, 102, 104, and 106).
156. EMILY’s List v. FEC, 569 F. Supp. 2d 18, 60 (D.D.C. 2008), rev’d, 581 F.3d 1 (D.C.
Cir. 2009); Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. FEC, No. 3:08-CV-483, 2008 WL 4416282, at
*12 (E.D. Va. Sept. 24, 2008), aff’d, 575 F.3d 342 (4th Cir. 2009), vacated as moot, 130 S. Ct.
2371 (2010).
157. EMILY’s List, 581 F.3d at 17–18, 21.
158. See Funds Received in Response to Solicitations, Allocation of Expenses by Sepa-
rate Segregated Funds and Nonconnected Committees, 75 Fed. Reg. 13,223 (Mar. 19,
2010) (to be codified at 11 C.F.R. pts. 100 and 106).
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nor intent, which the regulated group simply has to apply when deter-
mining which contributors it is required to disclose to the relevant
election authority. The strength of the donor intent model is thus the
relatively minimal regulatory burden it imposes on mixed-purpose
groups and accordingly the strong defense that can be mounted
against any charge that it is unduly burdensome from a constitutional
perspective. For example, because no committee or account must be
formed, the major purpose argument that has been raised against
PAC-style disclosure laws would appear to have no application to the
donor intent model.
The drawback of the donor intent model is potential imprecision.
Application of the California regulation could lead to a scenario
where virtually all donors to a mixed-purpose group are subject to dis-
closure because they all triggered the presumption by contributing to
the group after it made a first bite expenditure. This broad disclosure
could have the effect of obscuring the most important parties funding
a mixed-group’s election ads. Similarly, the FEC rule conceivably
could capture some donors who donated to a mixed-purpose group
after receiving a solicitation for campaign-related contributions but
who actually wished to fund the group’s issue advocacy. For this rea-
son, a presumption of donor intent may draw legal challenges on
grounds of overbreadth. But this issue could potentially be alleviated
by clarifying that donors who earmark their funds for campaign ads,
or otherwise affirmatively indicate a campaign-related purpose,
should be disclosed in the first instance with the presumption simply
serving as a default rule where the donor’s intent cannot be
ascertained.
The presumption of donor intent model is thus a viable alterna-
tive to PAC-style reporting or a “dedicated account” regime. To be
sure, the California regulation was narrowed slightly by the Ninth Cir-
cuit, and the FEC solicitation rule has been repealed, albeit on
grounds unrelated to disclosure. Nevertheless, the weight of the ex-
isting case law supports a well-tailored standard of donor intent for
the purposes of disclosure.
Conclusion
For many decades, the constitutionality and utility of campaign
finance disclosure has not been in doubt. Following the Citizens United
decision, however, corporations, unions, and other deep-pocketed in-
terests could exploit the existing weaknesses of the federal campaign
finance laws to spend anonymously in elections by contributing to
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mixed-purpose 501(c) groups. Attempts to strengthen the disclosure
requirements applicable to mixed-purpose groups at the federal and
state level in turn spurred a coordinated litigation effort by opponents
of campaign finance to blunt the effects of these new or proposed
enhancements of disclosure laws. The result of these developments is
that citizens must now simultaneously contend with both an unprece-
dented lack of transparency in federal elections and a broad assault
on the constitutionality of existing laws.
It is thus imperative in the aftermath of Citizens United for
lawmakers and advocates of political reform to find or develop new
models of disclosure that are both effective and constitutionally defen-
sible. The laws presented in this Article provide a variety of such mod-
els and many have already survived, at least in large part,
constitutional challenges in the lower courts. Without further reform
the loopholes in federal disclosure law relating to mixed-purpose
groups will become more damaging. Citizens United will have initiated
not only an epoch of unbridled corporate and union spending in our
elections, but also an era of unprecedented public ignorance of such
spending and its potentially corruptive effects on our democracy.
